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Abstract
Employing a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Spanish economy, this study 
explicitly aims to characterise the potential impact of Kyoto and European Union environmental policy targets on 
specific agricultural activities up to 2020. The model code is modified to characterise the emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), emissions quotas and carbon taxes, whilst emissions reductions are applied to all six registered greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). Compared to a ‘business-as-usual’ baseline scenario, by 2020, GDP and employment fall 2.1% and 
2.4%, respectively, whilst the retail price index rises 3.4%. In agriculture, the indices of output (4.3% fall), and supply 
price (7.7% rise) perform relatively worse, whilst there is a concomitant cumulative fall in aggregate farm incomes of 
€1,510 million by 2020. The more notable impact in agriculture is attributed to its relatively higher emissions inten-
sity. Consequently, we record an agricultural marginal abatement cost estimate of €86 ton–1 of CO2 equivalent by 2020, 
which is consistent with other estimates in the literature. In addition, we find that the optimal mix of emissions reduc-
tions across specific agricultural sectors is a function of the degree of substitutability of their emitting activities. In 
light of estimated income losses within the strategically important farm sector, a final simulation contemplates an 
‘agricultural cost-neutral’ emissions reduction policy akin to a cross compliance payment between 2013 and 2020. This 
is found to reduce food price rises, whilst altering the optimum mix of agricultural emissions reductions across spe-
cific agricultural activities.
Additional key words: agriculture; computable general equilibrium; European Union Climate & Energy Package; 
Kyoto protocol.
Resumen
El control de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero en España: costes para los sectores agrarios
Empleando un modelo dinámico recursivo de equilibrio general computable (EGC) de la economía española, este 
estudio analiza el impacto de las políticas medioambientales de Kioto y de la Unión Europea (el acuerdo ‘20/20/20’), 
sobre distintas actividades agrarias hasta 2020. En comparación con el escenario de referencia, se pronostican caídas 
en el PIB y el empleo de un 2,1% y 2,4%, respectivamente, en 2020, mientras que el índice de precios al consumo sube 
un 3,4%. En agricultura, el índice de producción (que cae un 4,3%) y el de precios (aumenta un 7,7%), empeoran y 
además los ingresos acumulados de los agricultores bajan 1.510 millones de euros en 2020. El impacto más acusado 
en el sector agrario se atribuye a la mayor intensidad de sus emisiones donde se estima un coste marginal de reducción 
de 86 € t–1 de CO2 equivalente para 2020, lo cual es consistente con las estimaciones existentes en la bibliografía. 
Además se observa que la combinación óptima de reducción de emisiones en los diferentes sectores agrarios depende 
del grado de sustitución de las actividades emisoras. A la vista de las pérdidas de ingresos observadas en el sector 
agrario, se contempla un escenario de mitigación de coste-cero para los agricultores, semejante a un pago de condicio-
nalidad, entre 2013 y 2020. Los resultados señalan una mitigación en el incremento de los precios de los alimentos y 
una redistribución en la combinación óptima de las emisiones en los sectores agrarios.
Palabras clave adicionales: agricultura; modelo de equilibrio general computable; paquete de energía y cambio 
climático; protocolo de Kioto sobre el cambio climático.
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been granted a softer emissions reduction target (see 
Table 1). Notwithstanding, in light of Spain’s impres-
sive growth between 1990-2007, some commentators 
estimate that its economy still faces relatively steep 
emissions reductions in order to meet its Kyoto com-
mitment (Labandeira & Rodríguez, 2010; González-
Eguino, 2011).2 In the post-Kyoto period an independ-
ent ‘diffuse’ sector (includes agriculture) emissions 
target is in place up to 2020 (see Table 1).3 A cursory 
examination of Spanish emissions data reveals that 
diffuse emissions make up 55% of all Spanish GHG 
emissions, of which the transport sector produces the 
largest proportion (accounting for more than 40% of 
total energy consumed in Spain) followed by the agri-
culture sector which itself accounts for 14% of total 
Spanish GHG emissions. A closer look at Spain’s ag-
ricultural emissions reveals that methane emissions 
from livestock activities constitute the largest propor-
tion of total agricultural emissions (38%), followed by 
nitrous oxide from fertiliser application (34%), and 
carbon dioxide from petroleum usage (16%). The re-
maining emissions are largely nitrous oxide from ma-
nure, and small amounts of methane released during 
field burning in the cereals sectors. 
The adaptability of computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) modelling has led to a range of climate change 
studies with varying focal points and objectives. These 
‘top-down’ representations can be employed to quan-
tify the direct and indirect impacts (i.e., prices, outputs, 
costs) of climate change policies because of their 
unique ability to assess the interactions between many 
different agents and sectors across the whole economy. 
This key strength is particularly pertinent when exam-
ining the integrated nature of energy production and 
usage across industries and consumers, as well as mac-
roeconomic impacts of policy controlled emissions 
targets. Notwithstanding, as a caveat, comparing with 
bottoms-up ‘engineering’ representations, top-down 
Introduction
The necessity for international cooperation in con-
ceiving a global strategy to both mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, coupled with the absence of a sover-
eign international authority, bestowed upon individual 
governing bodies world-wide a sense of collective 
responsibility to engender binding and effectual policy 
measures. Against this background, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was created, which in turn oversaw the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol. This international accord set a 
detailed roadmap for curbing both carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions, as well as a collective basket of non-CO2 
‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG) emissions.1 More recently, the 
European Union (EU) has taken the lead in fighting 
climate change, by agreeing a series of further unilat-
eral emissions cuts over the 2013-2020 period under 
the auspices of its Climate and Energy Package (CEP).
Amid discussions on the best way to achieve these 
goals, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
emerged for a test period in 2005-2007 and thereafter 
for different commitment phases from 2008-2028. The 
ETS created an internal trading market for CO2 emis-
sions permits, initially allocated across a select group-
ing of sectors (excluding agriculture), with the intention 
that abatement be incentivised via charges for exceeding 
(gradually contracting) domestic emissions limits or 
revenues to more efficient firms from the sale of excess 
permit allocations. Individual member states distribute 
emissions permits subject to both the approval of the 
European Commission and those limits stipulated 
within the National Allocation Plan (NAP). When Kyoto 
expires, the ETS will continue to operate to extend CO2 
emission reductions to 2020 (see Table 1). 
For non-ETS GHG emissions, parallel EU-wide 
emissions reductions are implemented up to 2012, al-
though under a ‘burden sharing agreement’ Spain has 
Abbreviations used: CAP (common agricultural policy); CEP (climate & energy package); CGE (computable general equilibrium); 
CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalent); ETS (emissions trading scheme); EU (European Union); GDP (gross domestic product); GHG 
(greenhouse gas); GWP (global warming potential); IO (input-output); LULUCF (land use, land-use change and forestry); MAC 
(marginal abatement cost); NAP (National Allocation Plan); tCO2e (tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent); UNFCC (United Nation 
Framework Convention on Climate Change).
1 The non-CO2 gases within the remit of Kyoto are: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Importantly, these gases have a considerably higher Global Warming Potential (GWP) than CO2.
2 Spain has been permitted an emissions target of 15% above 1990 levels, rising to a projected 37% when heavy usage of Kyoto ap-
proved ‘flexibility mechanisms’ (20%) and carbon sinks (2%) are accounted for.
3 In the case of agricultural practice, a proportion of its pollution is classified as point source (i.e., emitted from a single discharge 
point such as a pipe). However, a large proportion is non-point source (difficult to determine an emitting source), which implies a more 
‘diffuse’ nature to its emissions.
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models have less detail on specific technology options, 
which may compromise the accuracy of sectoral abate-
ment cost estimates.
In surveying the existing literature we observe 
multi-region studies (e.g. Böhringer & Rutherford, 
2010), whilst differences in the decomposition of emis-
sions gases in specific member countries has given rise 
to sectorally more detailed single region CGE studies 
(e.g. Dellink et al., 2004). As expected, the general 
consensus is that meeting emissions reduction targets 
entails a short to medium term cost, but the differ-
ences in contexts and policies modelled render direct 
comparison of results difficult, or of little value. A 
cursory review of the relevant Spanish literature (La-
bandeira et al., 2004, 2009a; Labandeira & Rodríguez, 
2010; González-Eguino, 2011) suggests that gross 
domestic product (GDP) falls of between 0.1% and 1% 
by 2012 may result from emissions restrictions.
A key issue for this study is how the agriculture 
sector is impacted directly from facing its own emis-
sions reduction targets, and indirectly from facing 
higher energy prices under the auspices of the ETS 
scheme. Given the diffuse nature of agricultural emis-
sions, how reductions targets are to be achieved is left 
as an internal matter in each member state (European 
Parliament, 2009a) and is beyond the focus of this 
research. Some CGE applications (Labandeira & Ro-
dríguez, 2006; Van Heerden et al., 2006; Labandeira 
et al., 2009b) report limited impacts on agriculture, but 
only account for emissions controls on combustion, 
whilst not accounting for agriculture’s diffuse emis-
sions. One exception is a study assessing the Dutch 
economy by Dellink et al. (2004). The authors estimate 
relatively sharper falls in agricultural production 
(–4.8%) compared with the wider economy (–2.7%) 
by 2050, citing the relatively higher emissions inten-
sity in agriculture (i.e., including non-CO2 gases). 
Given a general paucity of antecedents within the 
quantitative literature, there exists an additional need 
to assess the economic impacts of emissions targets on 
a selection of specific livestock and cropping practises. 
Our focus on Spain is also justified by its strong growth 
record (pre-crisis) and the consequent sharp adjustment 
process it will need to follow in order to adhere to its 
emissions targets, which is likely to have important 
implications on the agricultural sectors. Furthermore, 
with few exceptions (González-Eguino, 2011) existing 
CGE Spanish studies have either analysed only the 
impact of meeting the Kyoto 2012 targets or other 
hypothetical short term policy targets. In addition to 
Kyoto, this research includes a detailed treatment of 
the EU CEP package, whilst a detailed baseline of an-
nual macroeconomic projections to 2020 which ac-
counts for the impact of the crisis on investment and 
capital accumulation, favours the usage of a recursive 
dynamic CGE treatment. A further important charac-
Table 1. Emissions reduction schemes and their coverage
Scheme and targets Industrial coverage Gas coverage1
— European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS): domestic permit EU wide ETS emissions reduction 
of 8% on 1990/1995 levels by 2012 (Kyoto 2007-2012). 
Different base years are employed for different greenhouse 
gases. Burden sharing allows Spanish reduction to 15% 
above 1990 levels. Under the CEP, ETS emissions reduc-
tion of 21% on 2005 levels by 2020.
2007-2020: coal, oil, gas, petrol, electric-
ity, metals, paper, glass, ceramics, cement 
and lime
CO2 (plus PFCs 
from metals from  
2013 onwards)
2012-2020: Aviation CO2
2013-2020: Chemicals CO2, N2O
— (Up to 2012) Non-ETS: Kyoto stipulates the same per-
centage targets as the ETS to 2012. 
Non-ETS industries non-CO2, other man-
ufacturing (including food processing), 
transport, chemicals (up to 2011), agricul-
ture, waste, aviation (up to 2012). 
CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs, SF6
— (2013-2020) Diffuse sectors: EU emissions down by 
10% on 2005 levels by 2020. Spanish target identical to 
the EU average (i.e., –10%).
Transport, buildings, agriculture, waste CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs, SF6
— (2013-2020) Non-ETS, non-diffuse sectors: Maintain 
Kyoto emissions limits to 2020.
Food processing, services and manufactur-
ing not elsewhere classified.
CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs, SF6
1 PFCs: perfluorcarbons. HFCs: hydrofluorcarbons.
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teristic of this study is that we account for all six GHGs 
given the relative importance of non-CO2 gases in ag-
riculture, whilst we combine environmental policy 
targets with an explicit representation of common ag-
ricultural policy (CAP) mechanisms.4 In a further ex-
periment, we contemplate the mitigating impacts of a 
hypothetical support mechanism (akin to a ‘cross-
compliance’ Pillar I transfer payment) post-2013, which 
reimburses the agriculture sector for any costs incurred 
in meeting environmental targets. 
The objective of this research is to explore the effects 
on Spanish agriculture of the emissions reduction targets 
proscribed by the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Energy 
Package, employing a dynamic CGE framework.
Methodology
Model database 
To support our construction of the accompanying 
CGE Spanish database, the latest available Input-
Output (IO) tables (year 2007) published by the Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2010) are a principle 
source of secondary data. Importantly, the conditions 
imposed by the IO table underlie the fundamental ac-
counting conventions of the CGE model framework. 
For the purposes of this study, our aggregation focuses 
principally on agricultural activities, whilst remaining 
sectors are those identified within the EU ETS, the 
non-agricultural ‘diffuse sectors’ (see Table 1), and 
‘residual’ manufacturing and services activities. The 
model has three broad factors (capital, labour and ag-
ricultural land), of which labour is further subdivided 
into ‘highly skilled’, ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’. House-
hold Survey Data (INE, 2009) permit a disaggregation 
of private household purchases for up to eight distinct 
disposable income groupings. In addition, trade is dis-
aggregated by ‘intra-’ and ‘extra-EU’ routes.
UNFCCC (2011) Spanish submissions data on emis-
sions are separated into fuel combustion; fugitive 
emissions; industrial processes; solvent and other prod-
uct usage; land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF); waste emissions; and agricultural emis-
sions. The data set includes concordance by industry 
activity, although in some cases further disaggregation 
is required to map to the model sectors. For combustion 
emissions, UNFCCC data is combined with energy 
usage data from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2011), and intermediate input data from the Spanish 
IO database (INE, 2010), to map emissions by fuel 
type, industry and source (i.e., domestic/imported). 
Fugitive and industrial process emissions are assigned 
to specific IO industries following Rose & Lee (2009), 
whilst solvent and other product emissions all originate 
from the chemical industry. Waste emissions are ap-
portioned between the IO sectors of market and non-
market sanitation services, whilst LULUCF emissions 
are excluded from the current analysis.5 Spanish agri-
cultural emissions by activity are, in general, clearly 
disaggregated into specific agricultural activities 
within the UNFCCC database, although nitrogen run-
off from agricultural soils is assigned employing ad-
ditional data on land usage (MARM, 2008) and nitro-
gen uptake for specific crops (MARM, 2010). As a final 
step, non-CO2 emissions by each sector are converted 
into CO2 equivalents (CO2e) employing global warm-
ing potential (GWP) conversion ratios.
Model framework 
The standard CGE framework is a ‘demand’ led 
model, based on a system of neoclassical final, inter-
mediate and primary demand functions. Under the 
assumption of weak homothetic separability, a multi-
stage optimisation procedure allows demand decisions 
to be broken into ‘nests’ to provide greater flexibility 
through the incorporation of differing elasticities of 
substitution. Moreover, accounting identities and mar-
ket clearing equations ensure a general equilibrium 
solution for each year that the model is run. After ap-
propriate elasticity values are chosen to allow model 
calibration to the database, and an appropriate split of 
4 Given that the CAP introduces supply rigidities into agricultural markets, whilst maintaining relatively inefficient farmers in 
production, it implies that the necessary rise in agricultural MAC to comply with emission reductions targets is higher (compared 
with a hypothetical reality where the CAP did not exist).
5 Whilst the UNFCCC data provide a figure for the total sequestration of land, due to data limitations, we were unable to disaggregate 
this sequestration potential between agricultural land types and forestry land. Moreover, due to the difficulty in valuing forestry 
land, the model does not have a land factor in the forestry sector.
6 In order to ensure a general equilibrium solution, the number of endogenous variables and model equations must be equal.
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endogenous-exogenous variables is selected (closure)6, 
specific exogenous macroeconomic or sector specific 
‘shocks’ can be imposed to key variables (e.g., tax/
subsidy rates, primary factor supplies, technical change 
variables, or real growth in GDP and/or its compo-
nents). The model responds with the interaction of 
economic agents within each market, where an outcome 
is characterised by a ‘counterfactual’ set of equilibrium 
conditions. For the interested reader, key equations are 
reproduced in Suppl. Table 1 (pdf).
To improve our estimates of the supply responsive-
ness of agricultural activities to emissions targets in 
the context of supply rigidities and support policies, 
additional code is implemented to support the repre-
sentation of the CAP. This follows previous CGE ag-
ricultural studies and is described in Table 2. As an 
important driver of (carbon dioxide) emissions, modi-
fications are also made to the intermediate and final 
demands energy nests (Burniaux & Troung, 2002). 
Energy demands are now separated from non-energy 
demands, where in the production nest they are treated 
as part of value added (rather than intermediate inputs) 
owing to the important relationship between (energy 
using) capital and energy. Furthermore, electrical and 
non-electrical (i.e., coal, gas, oil, bio-fuels) demands 
are in separate nests. For producers, this implies that 
primary energy (unlike electricity) can also be used as 
a ‘feedstock’ input into other industries (i.e., fertilizer, 
refining of raw energies) rather than directly consumed 
as an energy source. 
Changes in GHG emissions are assumed to be di-
rectly proportional to five driving mechanisms in the 
model (Rose & Lee, 2009): output, land use7, fertiliser 
use (in the crop sectors), fossil fuel use by firms and 
households.8 Furthermore, sectors are granted some 
flexibility to mitigate their emissions by reducing their 
fertiliser use (e.g., crop sectors), or substituting toward 
cleaner energy sources or less energy intensive capital, 
while output related emissions can only be reduced by 
a contraction in the scale of operation9. Additional tax 
wedges between pre- and post-emission cost prices, 
measured in Euros per metric tonne of CO2e, are in-
serted into the model code on each of these five trans-
action flows to characterise endogenous changes in 
marginal abatement costs (MAC) for sectors outside 
the ETS scheme and the exogenous permit price for 
ETS sectors, respectively. 
Kyoto emissions reductions to 2012 are modelled by 
(exogenous) annual linear reductions in both the number 
of domestic permits issued for the ETS sectors and the 
relevant emissions quota for non-ETS sectors. It should 
be noted that since Spain is assumed to be a ‘price 
taker’ within the ETS (i.e., small country assumption), 
the permit price is held exogenous in all years. Then, 
in line with Labandeira & Rodriguez (2010), Spanish 
industries are able to endogenously import additional 
permits from other EU Member States subject to do-
mestic demand conditions (determined by the macro- 
economic projections), gradual reductions in the exog-
enous supply of domestic permits, and year-on-year 
exogenous changes in the permit price. The purchase/
sale of permits from/to other EU members is subse-
quently recorded as an additional import/export in the 
national accounts, adjusting the trade balance, and 
subsequently Spanish GDP.
In keeping with the EU’s decision to initially allocate 
the majority of permits for free (employing a ‘historical’ 
emissions criterion), ETS permit allocation up to 2012 
is via a ‘grandfathering’ method, whilst in the subsequent 
period (2013-2020), an increasing proportion of permits 
are auctioned at different rates (depending on the sector). 
Permit allocation is modelled by refunding the propor-
tion of the cost incurred by firms in ‘buying’ grandfa-
thered permits via a lump-sum subsidy payment, as set 
out in Edwards & Hutton (1999) and Parry (2002). Thus, 
in a given year, if 40% of a sector’s permits are auc-
tioned, only 60% of the cost is refunded. Revenue raised 
from the auctioning of permits is paid, along with taxes 
on non-ETS sector emissions, to the government as tax 
revenue.10 For the non-ETS sectors, emissions totals are 
subject to ceiling limits governed by inequality con-
straint equations. These equations directly determine an 
endogenous MAC per tonne of CO2e associated with 
meeting the specified reduction.
 7 Methane released from rice-growing
 8 For example, vegetable sector emissions from combustion of petrol are in direct proportion to the percentage change in the 
quantity demanded of petrol; output emissions vary in direct proportion to percentage changes in output.
 9 The authors recognise the potential for emissions reductions from adaptations in production processes as an area for further 
research. See Hertel et al. (2008).
10 There are various hypothetical options for revenue recycling of environmental tax revenues (‘double dividend’) which lie beyond 
the scope of this study.
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Given the lack of relevant Spanish data sources, cali-
bration is facilitated through usage of substitution and 
expenditure elasticities from the standard GTAP version 
7.1 data base (Narayanan & Walmsley, 2008). In the 
energy module, substitution elasticities from GTAP-E 
(Burniaux & Troung, 2002) for developed countries are 
employed. Following Dixon & Rimmer (2002), export 
demand elasticities are calibrated to upper level GTAP 
Armington elasticities, whilst the transformation elas-
ticities for land (between uses) and agricultural industry 
substitution elasticities between (i) intermediate inputs 
and value added and (ii) individual intermediate 
inputs are taken from Keeney & Hertel (2005). Central 
tendency estimates of labour supply elasticities for 
Spain are taken from Fernándes-Val (2003) whilst for 
agro-food products, private household expenditure 
elasticities are taken from a study by Moro & Sckokai 
(2000) on Italian households stratified by wealth.
Closure and scenario design
The study implements sequential shocks for three 
alternative realities during the period 2007-2020. In 
our business as usual ‘baseline’ scenario (i.e., no emis-
sions restrictions), a projection of the Spanish economy 
is plotted by exogenising and shocking real GDP, con-
sumption, investment, government expenditure and 
aggregate exports (see Table 3). Aggregate imports (and 
by implication the trade balance) adjust endogenously 
as a residual component of the aggregate demand func-
tion, whilst the (numeraire) exchange rate is fixed. 
Shocks to aggregate investment and public expenditure 
simulate the fallout from the recent financial crisis, the 
fiscal stimulus that took place in the crisis years and 
the ‘austerity measures’ that followed. Further shocks 
simulate exogenous world fuel price changes, total 
factor productivity changes for all sectors, consumer 
taste changes toward white meats (see Table 3) and 
reforms to the CAP (see Table 2). For the duration of 
the baseline scenario, emissions in all sectors are free 
to rise or fall in line with the endogenously determined 
behaviour of their drivers.
Scenario EPol contemplates the impact of EU envi-
ronmental policy as prescribed by current Kyoto targets 
and a number of EU policy initiatives. A fully detailed 
description of this scenario is provided in Table 1. To 
gauge the macroeconomic impacts on Spain’s economy, 
Table 2. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Modelling and Baseline Policy Shocks
A. Modelling
In the model data, coupled support payments to the agricultural sector are characterised as subsidies on land (e.g., set-aside and 
area payments) capital (e.g., headage premia on livestock, investment aids), production (e.g., production aids, stock purchases) 
and intermediate input subsidies (seed payments, irrigation aids, distribution and marketing payments, etc.). Given the policy 
evolution of the CAP, sector specific payments are gradually decoupled year on year and reconstituted as a Single Farm Pay-
ment (SFP), which is introduced as a uniform subsidy rate on the land factor (Frandsen et al., 2003). Intervention prices are 
modelled as changes to trade protection whilst pillar I modulation payments are implemented year on year as a direct payment 
to the ‘agricultural farm household’, which collects all agricultural policy payments and returns on agricultural value added. 
Employing inequality constraint step functions (Elbehri & Pearson, 2005), production quotas are modelled for raw sugar and 
milk (Lips & Rieder, 2005), as well as Uruguay Round constraints on export quantities and subsidy expenditure. In agricultural 
factor markets, the movement of heterogeneous land types between agricultural sectors is governed by a three nested elasticity 
of transformation function (OECD, 2003), whilst a land supply curve is incorporated within the model code based on an econo-
metric specification (Renwick et al., 2007). 
B. Policy shocks
•  Introduction of the SFP — year on year shocks (2008-2015) taken from historical data (FEGA, 2010). Complete decoupling 
of agricultural payments by 2015.
•  Modulation implemented based on historical data (FEGA, 2010). Modulation projections assumed to rise to 3% by 2015. 
Given the structure of the agricultural industry in Spain and the small farms exemption, historical data reveals that Spain’s 
modulation rate is below the EU policy prescribed rate (1% a year from 4% in 2006 to 10% in 2012) (FEGA, 2010). Conse-
quently, we assume that the modulation rate rises to 3% by 2015. Pillar II Modulation payments transferred to farm household 
income function.
•  Dairy (2008) and sugar (2008-2010) intervention price reductions.
•  Export subsidy changes based on historical data (2008-2009) (FEGA, 2010).
•  2% increase in EU wide milk quota sanctioned by the EU (April 2008). Year on year 1% increases (2009-2014). Abolition 2015.
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appropriate macroeconomic ‘shifter’ variables are 
exogenised to allow each component of aggregate de-
mand (i.e., real GDP, consumption, investment, etc.) 
to become endogenous. These shifter variables assume 
their exact same values as recorded in the baseline, 
where any additional impacts on GDP, consumption, 
investment etc. are attributed to the incremental impacts 
of emissions targets.
As noted previously (section ‘Model Framework’), 
the ETS permit price is exogenous (small country as-
sumption), which allows for endogenous changes in 
pan-European imports/exports of permits at the given 
price. Thus, shocks to ETS permit prices follow his-
torical trends up to 2011 (www.sendeco2.com), whilst 
from 2012 the price is projected forward linearly in 
order to meet a final price of €50 ton–1 of CO2.11 Do-
mestic ETS permits, which are controlled exogenous-
ly, are grandfathered until 2012. Full auctioning then 
becomes the rule for the electricity sector from 2013, 
whilst the remaining ETS sectors linearly increase the 
proportion of permits to be auctioned towards a 70% 
target by 2020 (European Parliament, 2009b). In the 
non-ETS sectors, with the enforcing of emissions lim-
its in scenario EPol, the MAC assumes a positive value 
in those cases where limits become binding and there-
fore abatement is necessary. 
Agriculture is initially required to meet the 2012 
Kyoto target, and subsequently the 2020 diffuse sector 
target, whilst they are expected to remain outside the 
ETS for the whole period (Ancev, 2011).12 Since there 
remain non-diffuse sector emission flows outside the 
scope of the ETS that are not explicitly covered by 
emissions policy beyond the 2012 Kyoto target (see 
Table 1), Kyoto ceiling limits are maintained from 2013-
2020. In scenario EPol the model closure is modified 
so that Spanish intra-EU commodity import prices rise 
(relative to the baseline) in direct proportion to envi-
ronmental policy driven (Spanish) commodity export 
11 In an assessment by Capros et al. (2008), which was employed by the European Commission in preparation of the Climate and 
Energy Package, it was estimated that the permit price required to meet the emissions reductions for the ETS industries by 2020 
was €47 ton–1 of CO2. 
12 This article provides an informative discussion on the issues surrounding the extension of the ETS to agriculture.
Table 3. Baseline projections shocks (%) between 2007-2020 in Spain
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018 2020
Real GDP 0.9 –3.7 –0.2 0.8 1.6 1.8 1.9 3.6 3.6 3.6
Real Consumption (C) –0.6 –5.0 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.9 3.8 3.8 3.8
Real Investment (I) –4.4 –15.7 –7.6 –1.3 2.7 3.7 4.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
Real Public Expenditure ( G) 5.5 5.2 –0.7 –1.3 –0.8 –0.6 –0.6 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2
Real Exports (X) –1.1 –11.6 10.3 6.7 4.6 4.7 4.9 10.4 10.5 10.5
Population (P) 1.8 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bioethanol world prices (WP) 13.2 –5.5 32.5 10.6 –1.0 –0.4 0.7 3.4 2.2 –1.8
Biodiesel world prices (WP) 44.0 –25.7 6.0 19.9 0.4 –0.5 1.2 –1.0 0.4 –0.3
Coal world price (WP) 14.3 3.2 –6.7 –0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.5
Oil world price (WP) 37.3 –41.6 18.7 3.9 8.7 8.0 6.0 8.1 6.3 3.7
Crude gas world price (WP) 23.0 –58.7 21.6 27.4 8.6 –0.6 –0.7 4.7 1.1 3.2
Preferences for white meat 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
Preferences for red meat –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.7 –0.7 –0.7
Productivity changes: 
Crops 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.3 2.3 2.3
Ruminants 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
Non ruminants 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.4
Food 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8
Energy industries 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Manufacturing 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Others 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Sources: GDP, X, P up to 2016 (IMF, 2011) then project constant rate forward; C, I, G up to 2014 (EC, 2011) then project constant rate 
forward; WP Biofuels (OECD/FAO, 2011); WP Others (US EIA, 2010). 
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price rises.13 This assumption implies that EU trade will 
be at a competitive disadvantage to non-EU trade since 
(i) EU emissions reductions are stricter over the time 
horizon of our experiment (in the absence of a ‘Kyoto 
II’ agreement) and (ii) two large non-EU (agricultural) 
traders, the USA and Canada, are not are not signatory 
members of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Scenario EPolComp is identical to EPol, except 
that it ensures that post-Kyoto (2013-2020) environ-
mental policies are cost neutral for all the Spanish 
agricultural sectors. In other words, all revenue ac-
crued from agricultural environmental taxes is re-
turned via a lump sum payment to each agricultural 
sector. Given that the budget allocations are already 
agreed up to 2013, it is not envisaged that further farm 
payments will be made prior to this date. Of particu-
lar interest here are the effects, relative to scenario 2, 
on food prices, agricultural employment and farm 
household incomes.
Results
Unless otherwise stated, results are presented in 
comparison with the baseline scenario. Consequently, 
the results are not absolute changes but deviations from 
a ‘baseline’ path. Further sensitivity analyses can be 
found in Suppl. Table 2 (pdf).
Overview
As expected, the Spanish economy faces a short to 
medium-run economic cost with the implementation 
of the Kyoto and EU environmental targets, as evi-
denced by reductions in all real macro indicators and 
rises in general price indices (Table 4). In meeting 
Kyoto targets by 2012, Spanish GDP falls 0.7% in the 
EPol scenario with concurrent general price rises of 
1.6% (Table 4). By 2020, GDP and general price 
changes are exacerbated further (–2.1% and 3.4%, 
respectively). Spain’s relative macroeconomic contrac-
tion depresses both employment (–2.4%) and real 
wages (–1.9%), with supply-elastic ‘unskilled’ labour 
(used heavily by the agricultural sector) suffering more 
from the employment fall (–5.5%), whilst inelastic 
‘high-skilled’ labour witnesses a real wage drop of 
2.5%. In terms of economic welfare (real incomes), by 
2020 household utility falls, though slightly more so 
for the lowest income grouping (–3.1%) compared with 
the highest income grouping (–2.2%), indicating the 
potential regressivity of the environmental policy. This 
is because lower income households spend a larger 
share of their incomes on energy, where household 
energy costs have risen cumulatively by 48% (not 
shown) by 2020 compared with the baseline. 
Since the effect of the emissions quota reductions is 
to raise the cost of GHG emitting energy inputs and 
outputs, the primary energy sectors perform badly, in 
line with expectations. Among those industries which 
witness the most notable output declines by 2020 (re-
sults not shown) are coal (26.5%), gas (14.7%), oil 
(13.3%), and petrol industries (8.4%). 
In Figure 1, the annual evolution of (endogenous) 
emissions between 2007 and 2020 is estimated. Emis-
sions under the ETS increase slightly in 2009 despite 
the recession due to the dramatic fall in permit price 
(see Fig. 2), whilst ETS emissions surge in 2011-2012, 
and again in 2012-2013, due to the accession of avia-
tion and chemicals industries, respectively. From 2013 
onwards, ETS emissions continually rise in spite of a 
steadily rising (exogenous) permit price and a decreas-
ing domestic allocation of permits, as pan-EU permit 
trading (i.e., imports) plays an increasingly pivotal role 
in accommodating downwardly ratcheted domestic 
emissions targets for those sectors within the ETS 
(Table 1). Indeed, we estimate that Spain increases its 
imports of emissions permits from 24 million allow-
ances in 2007 to 50 million in 2020. In the case of 
agriculture, emissions reductions are frontloaded based 
on the commitments mandated under Kyoto, whilst the 
same is true for the remaining diffuse sectors which 
have already met their 2020 target by 2012, so in the 
period 2013-2020, these ceiling limits are maintained 
in the face of expansionary pressure from the recover-
ing economy.
Figure 2 compares the MAC in agriculture with the 
exogenously projected permit price. The average MAC 
across agricultural sectors reaches €51 ton–1 of CO2e 
(tCO2e) by 2012 (Kyoto target), whilst with economic 
recovery over the 2013-2020 period this estimate in-
creases to €86/tCO2e by 2020.
13 We make the simple assumption in our single country CGE model that environmental policy driven cost rises in Spain are, on 
average, representative for the rest of the EU.
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Finally, examining the impact of agricultural com-
pensation in scenario EPolComp from 2013-2020, the 
MAC in agriculture pivots upwards (Fig. 2), because 
(ceteris paribus) it encourages those agricultural pro-
ducers ‘at the margin’ to remain in production. Conse-
quently, the MAC required in order to discourage ad-
ditional production (and emissions) rises from €86/
tCO2e to €97/tCO2e. In contrast, additional compensa-
tion mitigates environmental policy induced increases 
in the cost of production (assuming zero profits), result-
ing in a relative fall in food (and general consumer) 
prices in comparison with scenario EPol (Table 4 and 
discussion below). Since such compensation only ap-
plies to a small sector, the macro impacts (Table 4) are 
negligible. With a cumulative cost of €1,301 million 
to the government (not shown), the scheme improves 
GDP by 0.1 percentage points (Table 4). 
Agriculture
In 2007, Spanish agriculture constitutes 4.0% of 
GDP (compared with an EU-27 average of 2.9%) (Eu-
rostat, 2012) and employs 877,000 people (INE, 2010). 
Table 4. Aggregate impacts (%) from emissions reductions targets in Spain vs. the baseline
2012
2020
Scenario  
‘EPol’
Scenario 
‘EPolComp’
Factor markets
Aggregate employment
Low skilled –2.4 –5.5 –5.2
Skilled –0.9 –2.1 –2.1
High skilled –0.5 –1.2 –1.2
Overall –1.0 –2.4 –2.3
Aggregate real wages
Low skilled –0.3 –0.6 –0.6
Skilled –0.9 –2.2 –2.1
High skilled –1.1 –2.5 –2.4
Overall –0.8 –1.9 –1.9
Aggregate capital usage –0,1 –0.3 –0.3
Aggregate real capital price –2,5 –6.0 –5.9
Agricultural factor markets
Average usage
Capital 0.5 0.8 1.6
Labour –0.7 –1.7 –0.9
Land 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real returns
Capital –1.4 –3.9 –2.1
Labour –0.3 –0.4 1.1
Land –2.8 –5.4 –3.5
Macro indicators
Real GDP –0.7 –2.1 –2.0
Consumption –0.6 –1.6 –1.5
Investment –2.1 –5.4 –5.4
Government spending 0.0 –0.2 –0.2
Exports –1.3 –2.4 –2.3
Imports –1.4 –3.1 –3.1
CPI 1.6 3.4 3.3
Food price index 2.9 3.7 3.0
Utility
Lowest income group –1.4 –3.1 –3.0
Highest income group –1.1 –2.2 –2.2
GDP: gross domestic product. CPI: Consumer price index. Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Examining the composition of Spanish agriculture, the 
main arable activities are fruit and vegetables, account-
ing for 13% and 17% of total agricultural product 
(Eurostat, 2012). Similarly, the largest livestock activ-
ity is pig production, constituting 12% of total agricul-
tural product. Examining the data in Table 5, it is en-
couraging to note that these three ‘large’ sectors 
exhibit relatively lower GHG emissions intensities.
In scenario EPol, by 2020 average primary agricul-
tural output falls 4.3% while prices rise 7.7% (Table 5). 
In the factor markets (Table 4) average agricultural 
employment falls 1.7% by 2020 compared with 2.4% 
for the Spanish economy, whilst at 0.4%, the decline in 
agricultural real wages is smaller than the Spanish aver-
age (2.0%). In the land market, rental rates fall by 5.4%, 
whilst land supply remains unchanged. Agricultural 
capital usage rises by 0.8% compared to a 0.3% decline 
for the entire economy. The fact that agricultural factor 
markets perform better compared to the whole economy, 
despite relatively greater contractions in output, reflects 
the changing composition between value added and 
intermediate inputs in this sector. More specifically, 
higher prices for fertiliser (in crops sectors) encourage 
farmers to substitute in favour of labour, land and 
capital. Consequently, cropping activities become more 
extensive (less fertiliser usage per hectare) in response 
to environmental policy.
The reasons why primary agricultural output and 
prices are disproportionately affected under emissions 
targets are principally related to the intensity and the 
substitutability of its emitting activities.14 Indeed, accord-
ing to our 2007 data (based on UNFCCC), one tonne of 
agricultural CO2e emissions corresponds to only €847 
of agricultural production (Table 5), compared to €6,709 
in the non-agricultural sector. With contractions in ag-
ricultural activity, real agricultural income is estimated 
to fall by 5.9%, leaving Spanish farmers €1,510 million 
worse off by 2020. This result motivates our exploration 
of an additional Pillar I type compensatory lump sum 
transfer to agricultural industries — our EPolComp 
scenario. As expected, this mitigates the negative impact 
on real agricultural incomes, which by 2020 fall 3.8% 
(€640 million) relative to the baseline — an improve-
ment of €870 million compared with the scenario EPol. 
A cursory examination of the bottom of Table 5 
shows that the aggregate agricultural sector averages 
mask a notable divergence in supply and price effects 
between cereals, livestock, fruit and vegetables activi-
ties. These effects are explored in further detail in the 
following sections.
14 In comparing total agricultural activity with the rest of the Spanish economy, González-Eguino (2011) derives the same result as 
this study.
Figure 1. The evolution of Spanish emissions over time. Source: 
Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 2. Emissions trading scheme (ETS) permit prices and 
marginal abatement costs for agriculture. Source: Agricultural 
abatement costs — Authors’ own calculations. ETS permit price 
up to 2011 from www.sendeco.com, then increased linearly to 
hit €50 in 2020 (Capros et al., 2008).
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Crops
Crops sectors have a considerably larger proportion 
of emissions due to energy combustion activities (30%) 
than livestock (4%). Consequently, there is more flex-
ibility in crop production to substitute away from 
‘dirtier’ energy inputs toward cleaner equivalents and/
or less energy intensive capital. Moreover, (nitrogen) 
fertiliser application in crops is also substitutable, 
whilst in livestock a large proportion of its emissions 
are ‘output’ driven (methane). As a result, there are 
larger percentage reductions in crop emissions (Table 5) 
vis-à-vis livestock. In general, cereals and oilseeds 
sectors fare the worst due to their relatively higher 
levels of GHG intensity (i.e, oilseeds, rice and wheat) 
and/or due to high dependency on non-EU feed imports 
of maize and oilseeds in the benchmark data which 
become relatively cheaper (vis-à-vis EU imports) due 
to stricter emissions controls within the EU. Barley 
also exhibits a comparably high GHG intensity com-
pared to other crops, although output falls by less de-
spite suffering a comparable price increase to wheat 
(Table 5). This is because Spanish wheat is more ex-
posed to competitive external trade,15 which implies a 
greater risk of non-EU import substitution. 
Elsewhere, vegetable industry output (supply price) 
falls 1.9% (rises 1.7%) compared with the baseline, 
whilst for the fruit industry corresponding output (sup-
ply price) estimates are –3.1%. (3.7%) (Table 5). Com-
pared with the cereals, oilseeds and olives industries, 
Table 5. GHG intensivity and performance of agricultural and food industries in 2020 vs. the baseline. Bold figures indicate 
weighted averages
Industry Emissions(tCO2e)
Production
(€/tCO2e)
Scenario ‘EPol’ Scenario ‘EPolComp’
% Change
in output
% Change in 
supply price
% Change 
in emissions
% Change
in output
% Change in 
supply price
% Change 
in emissions
Select agricultural sectors
Wheat 3,296 533 –10.3 10.8 –32.4 –9.3 9.8 –32.8
Barley 5,089 516 –2.8 13.3 –27.5 –1.9 9.3 –28.3
Maize 996 935 –11.9 7.3 –28.2 –11.9 7.4 –29.4
Rice 578 497 –29.5 24.7 –34.9 –29.8 25.3 –36.2
Oilseeds 617 599 –12.7 9.9 –32.2 –10.6 8.3 –31.4
Vegetables 1,016 6,928 –1.9 1.7 –16.2 –1.7 1.5 –17.1
Fruit 2,447 2,296 –3.1 3.7 –24.5 –2.5 3.0 –25.2
Olives 6,254 257 –4.2 23.6 –43.8 –3.2 17.0 –44.4
Cattle 8,632 353 –4.9 14.1 –5.4 –3.7 10.2 –4.3
Pigs 7,853 652 –3.8 10.8 –5.4 –2.8 7.1 –4.6
Sheepgoats 5,110 322 –4.2 12.7 –4.3 –3.2 8.6 –3.3
Poulteggs 563 5,663 –2.1 1.8 –6.2 –1.7 1.6 –6.2
Rawmilk 2,845 1,094 –2.3 6.2 –3.3 –1.9 4.8 –3
Select food sectors
Red meat 139 47,555 –5.2 8.6 –20.2 –3.9 6.3 –20.2
White meat 246 46,973 –3.0 5.0 –23.4 –2.4 3.7 –23.4
Dairy 610 15,111 –1.7 3.4 –11.7 –1.5 2.9 –11.7
Aggregate sectors
Cereals 10,417 573 –7.8 11.9 –29.1 –7.1 9.7 –29.9
Fruit & Vegetables 3,463 3,655 –2.4 2.6 –19.9 –2.1 2.2 –20.7
All cropping activities 24,878 1,048 –4.9 6.9 –25.1 –4.4 5.8 –25.9
Livestock 25,474 650 –3.4 8.9  –5.0 –2.6 6.2 –4.4
Agriculture 50,352 847 –4.3 7.7 –17.3 –3.7 6.1 –17.6
Food 8,193 24,765 –2.6 3.7 –24.5 –2.2 3.0 –24.6
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
15 Time series data from DATACOMEX reveals that wheat imports far exceed those for barley, whilst wheat exports are also 
noticeably larger than barley. Furthermore, the same data source reveals Spain’s heavy dependence on extra-EU imports of maize 
and oilseeds (primarily for animal feed).
M. Bourne et al. / Span J Agric Res (2012) 10(3), 567-582578
these larger agricultural sectors suffer relatively muted 
output reductions, although emissions reductions in 
percentage terms are comparable. This is because fruit 
and vegetable activities emit fewer emissions in rela-
tion to the size of the sector. Importantly, it should also 
be noted that significant exposure to export markets 
ensures that even limited environmental cost driven 
price rises lead to responsive output falls in these sec-
tors.16 In the olive sector, emissions intensity is par-
ticularly high (column 1, Table 5) owing to considerable 
nitrogen emissions from fertiliser usage,17 resulting in 
an MAC induced supply price rise of 23.6% compared 
with the baseline. Notwithstanding, output reductions 
are relatively small since a large majority of olive de-
mand is intermediate, subject to a (Leontief) inelastic 
demand curve by the downstream vegetable oils sector. 
Livestock
Within extensive livestock systems (i.e., cattle, 
sheep/goats) there are considerable methane emissions 
from enteric fermentation. Similarly, intensive livestock 
production (i.e., pigs), generates significant methane 
via manure management activities. Consequently, 
relative to the size of the sector, each of these sectors 
has high output driven emissions intensity. As a result, 
cumulative supply price rises in cattle (14.1%), sheep 
(12.7%) and pigs (10.8%) by 2020 are notable (Table 5). 
Each of these sectors has limited flexibility in modify-
ing their behaviour to reduce emissions; whilst live 
animals are predominantly employed as Leontief in-
termediate inputs in downstream food sectors implying 
inelastic demand responsiveness for these activities. 
Consequently, these industries do not fare as badly as 
their high GHG intensities suggest, with output reduc-
tions of 4.9% in cattle, 4.2% in sheep and goats and 
3.8% in pig production. As an intensive livestock sys-
tem, manure management in raw milk contributes a 
larger source of methane emissions relative to extensive 
cattle production, although this is outweighed by con-
siderably fewer enteric fermentation methane emissions 
in raw milk compared with cattle production.18 Conse-
quently, the GHG intensity in raw milk relative to cat-
tle is lower, resulting in more muted price and output 
impacts relative to the baseline. In contrast with other 
livestock activities, poultry and eggs is far less GHG 
intensive in relative terms with an output reduction of 
only 2.1% compared with the baseline. Examining 
downstream sector meat prices (Table 5), the price of 
white meat falls relative to red meat (5.0% compared 
to 8.6%). In part, this is because of the mitigating im-
pact of the poultry and eggs sector, whilst the higher 
price rise of red meat products is fuelled by larger price 
increases in ruminant livestock products (cattle; sheep 
and goats). The dairy industry witnesses a smaller price 
increase owing to relatively muted price rises in the 
upstream raw milk sector. 
Compensation scenario
The addition of a ‘cross-compliance’ lump sum 
compensation payment in EPolComp does not imply a 
uniform impact across the livestock and crop sectors 
(Table 5). Assuming perfect competition, a lump sum 
transfer payment would reduce (marginal cost) prices 
and encourage greater participation of farmers at the 
margin (and therefore greater production). On the other 
hand, to adhere to stipulated emissions reductions, even 
higher MACs are now required in light of increased 
farmer participation (and production). Given greater 
substitutability, the higher MAC encourages larger 
reductions in the usage of energy, fertiliser and land 
use driven emissions, thereby granting greater leeway 
to those sectors characterised by output driven emis-
sions. Consequently, the compensation scheme alters 
the optimal ‘emissions reduction mix’ among compet-
ing agricultural activities.
Examining Table 5, for most agricultural sectors the 
rise in costs provoked by relative MAC increases is 
more than offset by the compensation payment, such 
that prices fall and demand driven output rises com-
pared with EPol (Table 5). In the livestock sectors 
16 Fruit faces a larger price rise because it is more emissions intensive. Moreover, nitrous oxide emissions in fruit (UNFCCC, 2011) 
are almost three times the size as vegetables (despite the latters’ larger size).
17 Olive production has a relatively high nitrogen necessity per hectare, whilst in relation to the size of the sector, considerable land 
is devoted to this permanent crop. Consequently, GHG emissions are ‘relatively’ high.
18 Dairy cattle have a higher energy intake per head than non dairy cattle and consequently generate more kilos of methane a year 
(per head) via enteric fermentation than non dairy cattle. Notwithstanding, the size of the dairy herd is far smaller than the non dairy 
herd in Spain, such that aggregate methane emissions from enteric fermentation are much smaller.
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(particularly ‘cattle’, ‘sheep and goats’, and ‘pigs’) with 
a larger proportion of non substitutable output driven 
emissions, aggregate livestock output and emissions 
rise (0.8 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively) com-
pared with EPol. Consequently, compensatory emis-
sions reductions are required from crop activities 
(particularly cereals, fruit and vegetables), which have 
greater flexibility in reducing emissions at a reduced 
cost in terms of lost output. Interestingly, for some 
crops sectors (e.g. maize and rice, see Table 5) this 
unintended consequence of the compensation scheme 
in further focussing emissions reductions where they 
can be most easily made, is stronger than the mitigative 
effect of the compensation scheme, and output (price) 
falls (rises) slightly more than in the no compensation 
scenario. 
Discussion 
This study represents an important first step in ad-
dressing the economic costs of emissions reduction 
targets for Spanish agriculture (whilst also estimating 
some of the wider economy impacts) in the context of 
the complex structure of Kyoto and EU environmental 
policies. We do not examine the possibility of mandat-
ing agricultural emissions reductions within the ETS 
since at this time the possibility appears to be remote, 
whilst the merits of agriculture’s inclusion within such 
a scheme are largely confined to administrative con-
siderations which are beyond the scope of a determin-
istic equilibrium model (see Ancev, 2011; De Cara & 
Vermont, 2011). 
Whilst the underlying short to medium term eco-
nomic message of our study is (typically) pessimistic, 
these estimates are only partial in the sense that they 
do not account for the long term (discounted) social 
and economic gains from a reduced rate of global 
warming. A comparison with other Spanish studies 
reveals an array of base years, model assumptions (e.g., 
comparative static vs. dynamic), elasticities and sce-
nario designs. Notwithstanding, our Spanish GDP cost 
estimate in 2012 (–0.7%) falls within the (upper) range 
of estimates presented in the introduction.19 Impor-
tantly, our GDP estimate by 2020 (–2.0%) exceeds that 
of González-Eguino (2011) by 2030 (–0.4%), which 
may be due to the imposition of more restrictive emis-
sions targets pertaining to the EU’s Climate and En-
ergy Package. 
Examining the impacts on primary agriculture, we 
estimate an agricultural marginal abatement cost 
(MAC) of €86/tCO2e. Our 2020 estimate is broadly 
consistent with MAC estimates in the existing econom-
ics literature. For example, Perez-Domínguez (2005) 
and Leip et al. (2010) derive agricultural MACs of €81/
tCO2e and €108/tCO2e, respectively,20 while Moran 
et al. (2008) state that UK agriculture reaching its fea-
sible potential of 17.3% GHG emissions reduction 
would come at an MAC of £100/tCO2e by 2022. 
Similarly, other (principally engineering) studies report 
MACs in EU agriculture ranging between €50 and 
€140/tCO2e (De Cara & Jayet, 2006), with a corre-
sponding average agricultural MAC estimate of €69.60/
tCO2e (Vermont & De Cara, 2010).21 Moreover, we 
conclude that the sector appears to suffer more than the 
Spanish average due to the higher emissions intensity 
and type of emitting activities — a conclusion which is 
supported by Dellink et al. (2004) who also incorporate 
all six GHGs in their study of the Dutch economy. If 
such a result is true, it opens up the ethical debate on 
whether it is possible to balance agricultural emissions 
mitigation with food security concerns (Golub et al., 
2011). Moreover, unilaterally mandated tighter EU 
emissions targets on (inter alia) agriculture may un-
fairly impact on EU farmers whilst also encouraging 
potential ‘carbon leakage’ effects arising from food 
imports from countries outside of any environmental 
protection legislation (Sturm, 2011). Further disag-
gregation by specific agricultural industries reveals that 
cropping activities bear greater emissions reductions 
than livestock sectors such that aggregate agricultural 
emissions targets are met. This is because livestock is 
characterised by a greater proportion of non-substitut-
able output driven emissions. Given nitrous oxide’s 
considerably higher global warming potential compared 
with methane, it is to be expected that a more efficient 
19 We posit that our estimate is more pessimistic due to additional negative capital accumulation effects (i.e., dynamics).
20 The former refers to the Spanish agricultural MAC associated with a 10% emissions reduction, while the latter refers to the MAC 
faced by EU livestock associated with an EU wide 20% emissions reduction.
21 Direct comparisons are difficult because (i) estimates are from different fields of research (some are top-down’ economic models 
and some are ‘bottoms-up’ engineering type models); (ii) within fields of research the modelling assumptions differ, and (iii) the 
emissions reductions targets do not refer to the same emissions limits or year end periods.
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reduction in agricultural emissions at the margin may 
be achieved by reductions in fertiliser application. 
Nevertheless, our modelling assumption for output 
driven emissions does not account for adaptation strat-
egies in livestock sectors via technological improve-
ments and should, to some extent, be considered as a 
caveat of the research (see also below). 
A further scenario demonstrates how full agricul-
tural compensation (i.e., zero net cost emissions policy) 
reduces food price inflation, whilst the resulting infla-
tionary impact on the agricultural MAC has implica-
tions for the optimal emissions mix across agricultural 
sectors. Although we have not stipulated how such a 
payment would be implemented in practise, in concept, 
it is entirely consistent with the policy evolution of the 
current CAP toward simplified ‘cross-compliance’ 
transfer payments.
Our final thoughts rest on potential avenues for 
further research. It should be noted that at the current 
time, there are no published modelling studies for 
Spain (to our knowledge) which examine the potential 
for renewable energies in meeting emissions targets. 
In addition, further research should be directed toward 
incorporating the implications of changing land usage 
(particularly forestry land) and its concomitant reper-
cussions on CO2 sequestration potential in Spain. A 
final important issue relates to the sensitivity of tech-
nological improvements in agriculture to climate 
change and policy.22 In this study, our ruminant, non-
ruminant and crop total factor productivity (TFP) es-
timates are taken from Ludena et al. (2006) who em-
ploy FAOSTAT time series data (1941-2001) for 116 
countries to generate forecasts up to 2040. Whilst some 
deceleration in TFP is included representing an ‘im-
plicit’ account of climate change on yields, no ‘ex-
plicit’ climate change factors are incorporated into 
their analysis. Consequently, there is a greater need to 
link biophysical and economic models of Spain,23 
where additional climate change induced crop and 
livestock technological change estimates will have 
further implications for the emissions reductions mix 
reported in this paper. Continuing with this line of 
inquiry, it has been noted (EC, 2009) that an abstinence 
of adaptation and mitigation driven technological 
change in agriculture will accelerate medium to long 
run agricultural crop and pasture yield reductions 
owing to greater temperature rises, where those EU 
members on the northern basin of the Mediterranean 
face the highest risks. Although the exact extent of 
yield falls is not well understood, status quo ‘baseline’ 
projections (as in this study) may present an optimis-
tic picture of agricultural output, which when com-
pared with an emissions reduction scenario, overstates 
the potential relative economic costs of environmental 
policy. The discussion above provokes the question as 
to why farmers have not employed adaptation technol-
ogy strategies more readily. McCarl & Schneider 
(2000) suggest that risk aversion, management require-
ments and the lumpiness of investment decisions are 
factors which reduce farmer adoption rates of such 
technologies, whilst Joskow & Marron (1992) point 
to the high fixed costs associated with cost effective 
environmentally friendly technologies. Notwithstand-
ing, technology transfer is likely to receive greater 
attention in EU policy circles as the ongoing chal-
lenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
continue to gather momentum.
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